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Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp. and Excite, Inc.: The Impact of Banner Ad Keying 
on the Development of E-commerce. 
 
Michael Wu* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) is the future of 
business, not only for the United States, but also for the world.1  
Although it is still at an embryonic stage, e-commerce has the 
potential to drive economic growth for many years to come.2  
Whether or not e-commerce will reach its full potential 
correlates directly to the enforcement and application of law 
and policy in this digital marketplace.  Law and policy 
“decisions will have a major impact on the kind of environment 
in which e-commerce will develop and should therefore be 
crafted with care and with due recognition of its fragile and 
evolving nature.”3  As forming on-line businesses becomes 
easier and as the boundaries of traditional markets begin to 
blur, anti-competitive laws become more important to the 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School.  The 
author would like to thank Ted Kittila, and the numerous other editors and 
staff members who assisted him with this article.  The author would also like 
to thank Gina Tsai for all of her love and support. 
 1. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 9-11 (1999) 
(explaining that e-commerce will change the way business is conducted); 
George Anders, Click and Buy: Why – and Where – Internet Commerce is 
Succeeding, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED. (visited Sep. 25, 2000) 
<www.interactive.wsj.com/public/current/articles/SB912719949440084500. 
htm> (stating that e-commerce has the potential to become a $1 trillion online 
economy within the next ten years, and furthermore e-commerce will not only 
affect the economy, but it “is part of a broader process of social change, 
characterized by the globalization of markets, the shift towards an economy 
based on knowledge and information, and the growing prominence of all forms 
of technology in everyday life.”). 
 2. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, The Emerging Digital Economy 
(visited Sept. 25, 2000)  <www.ecommerce.gov/danintro.htm>. 
 3. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 1 
at 12. 
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development of e-commerce,4 and laws designed for the “bricks 
and mortar” world need to be re-examined given the realities of 
e-commerce.5 
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp.,6 the court handed down a decision that could retard the 
growth and potential of e-commerce.  The defendants, Netscape 
Communications Corp. and Excite, Inc. (together, 
“defendants”), operate Internet search engines that sell banner 
advertisements.7  To increase the efficiency of the banner ads, 
defendants programmed their search engines to link “key” 
search terms to a pre-selected set of banner ads, which enable 
them to provide context-sensitive advertising.8  One such set of 
banner ads, adult entertainment ads, is keyed to a list of over 
450 terms relating to adult entertainment, including the terms 
“playboy” and “playmate.”9  When search engine users “key-in” 
either of these terms, a banner ad for an adult entertainment 
site appears on the search results page, along with plaintiff 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc.’s (“PEI”)10 web site address.11  PEI, 
 
 4. See id. at 21. 
 Many e-commerce products benefit from non-rivalry (one 
person’s consumption does not limit or reduce the value of the 
product to other consumers), network externalities (each 
additional user of a product increases its value to other users), 
and increasing returns to scale (unit costs decrease as sales 
increase).  These factors create an environment where producers 
may seek to engage in practices that permit them to establish 
themselves as the, or part of the, de facto standard.  This can 
hinder innovation and competition. 
Id. 
 5. Id. at 22. 
 6. 55 F. Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 7. See id. at 1072.  Users of Internet search engines will key-in specific 
terms in order to find specific sites.  See id.  Using these terms, the search 
engine will compile a list of sites that either match or are related to such 
terms, and place them on the “search results” page.  See id.  The banner 
advertisements are placed at the top of these search results pages.  See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. (stating that defendants allow advertisers to increase the efficiency 
of their ads, through targeting certain demographic groups, by linking ads to 
the users’ search terms, which is  accomplished by linking specific search 
terms to a pre-selected group of banner ads).  Because there were many 
advertisers subscribing to such service, the ads from various advertisers were 
displayed on a rotating basis.  See id. at 1078. 
 10. PEI is the leading publisher of adult entertainment and its 
trademarks are recognized worldwide.  PEI’s trademarks “Playboy” and 
“Playmate” are registered with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office and the trademarks are valid and subsisting.  See id. at 1076.  PEI first 
registered its Playboy trademark in 1954 and its Playmate trademark in 1961.  
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alleging that such practice infringed upon and diluted its 
trademarks,12 moved for a preliminary injunction, which the 
district court denied.13  PEI appealed, but the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision.14 
The issue raised here is whether banner ad keying, as used 
by the defendants, constitutes trademark infringement or 
dilution.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding is important because if it 
stands, it will be a major setback for e-commerce.  By allowing 
companies to use their rivals’ trademarks for the purpose of 
selecting banner ads, the court would potentially allow these 
businesses to free ride off of the goodwill and reputation of 
their rivals, which undermines the purpose of trademark law.15  
This is significant because it may discourage companies from 
conducting business over the Internet.  The future of e-
commerce will be shaped by businesses,16 and if they are not 
afforded trademark protection in the digital economy, they may 
be hesitant to participate in it or to fully utilize it.  Moreover, a 
major concern of companies, with respect to conducting 
business on-line, is whether a predictable legal environment for 
doing business will exist on the Internet.17  Here, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a district court decision that, given the weight 
 
See id.  In 1997, PEI spent over $46,500,000 in advertising and reached net 
sales in excess of $296,622,000.  See id.  
 11. See id. at 1078. 
 12. See id. at 1072.  Playboy argued that its trademark was infringed 
upon and diluted by defendants when (1) defendants sold a group of words, 
including the words “playboy” and “playmate,” to advertisers; (2) programmed 
adult entertainment banner ads to run in response to the words “playboy” or 
“playmate”; and (3) actually displayed such banner ads on the search results 
page.  See id. 
 13. See id. at 1070.  The District Court judge held that PEI: failed to 
establish that defendants  used its trademark (as opposed to ordinary English 
words) in interstate commerce; did not demonstrate that a likelihood of 
confusion existed; and failed to show trademark dilution.  See id.  The court 
also held that the First Amendment protected the defendants’ use of those 
words and defendants’ use of the words was protected by the doctrine of fair 
use.  See id. 
 14. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 202 F.3d 
278 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding, without oral argument, that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying the preliminary injunction, and that it 
did not rely on erroneous legal premises). 
 15. See infra Section I Part B(3): Free Riding. 
 16. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra 
note 1, at 12. 
 17. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, 
<www.ecommerce.gov/danc8.htm>, at 1. 
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of authority, should have been overruled.18  Courts must apply 
the laws in light of the realities of e-commerce.19  If they are 
applying the laws inconsistently, it may deter business 
participation in the digital marketplace and thus substantially 
hamper the growth of e-commerce.20 
This comment will examine whether the district court 
properly applied federal trademark law in the realm of 
cyberspace and will maintain that the court erred in its 
rationale by holding that the defendants used generic, English 
words, as opposed to PEI’s trademarks.  Section I will list and 
describe the relevant precedent; section II will discuss the 
court’s holding and rationale; and section III will analyze and 
critique this rationale.  This comment will conclude that not 
only should the holding be overruled, but that the use of banner 
ad keying should be restricted and should be subject to the fair 
use doctrine. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The Background section consists of two parts.  Part A 
discusses the precedent concerning trademark infringement 
and trademark dilution, the two claims brought by PEI, and 
the court’s reasoning in the case.  Part B discusses related 
issues, including meta-tags, domain names, free riding, 
trademark vigilance, and the Internet.  Part B also analyzes 
the legal, economic and policy arguments for the restriction of 
banner ad keying, as practiced by the defendants. 
 
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND TRADEMARK DILUTION 
 
1. Preliminary Injunction 
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act grants preliminary 
injunctive relief when the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the 
plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits, (2) absent an 
injunction the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury, (3) the 
 
 18. See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL 
724000, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D.Va. Apr. 10, 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin 
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).  Both courts found that 
the defendants’ use of the words “playboy” or “playmate” was an infringement 
on PEI’s trademarks. 
 19. See infra Section I Part B(5): Internet Regulation Generally. 
 20. See id. 
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scale of hardship tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) it is in the 
public interest to grant the injunction.21  Because courts 
assume that society values fair competition and the protection 
of trade names, if the plaintiff demonstrates that it will likely 
succeed on the merits, two things follow: (1) it will be presumed 
that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, and (2) that 
granting an injunction will be in the public interest.22  
Therefore, the two main parts of the test are whether the 
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits and whether the 
relative harm to the plaintiff, if the injunction is denied, 
outweighs the harm to the defendant if the injunction is 
granted.23 
 
2.  Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 
a. Trademark Infringement 
 
A plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits depends on 
whether it can show that it uses and owns the trademark, that 
defendant is using plaintiff’s trademark or a similar one, and 
that defendant’s use of the trademark harms plaintiff by 
causing a likelihood of consumer confusion.24  The first element 
can be satisfied by the plaintiff’s registration with the Principal 
Register in the Patent and Trademark Office.  Registration is 
prima facie evidence of a trademark’s validity and entitles the 
holder of the mark to exclusive use and ownership of that 
mark.25  The second element, whether the defendant is using 
 
 21. See Alta Vista Corp., Ltd. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d 72, 75 
(D. Mass. 1998); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Ent Corp., 
174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. 
Supp.2d 1098, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 22. See Alta Vista Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d at 75 (citing Hypertherm, Inc. v. 
Precision Products, Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)).  See also Calamari 
Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1015 (D. Mass. 
1988) (arguing that it is in the public interest to prevent consumer confusion); 
Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1066 (citing Metro Pub., Ltd. v. 
San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that: 
“[o]nce the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily 
presumed that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is 
not granted.”)). 
 23. See Calamari Fisheries, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1005. 
 24. See Alta Vista Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76. 
 25. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1047; Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (2001). 
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the plaintiff’s trademark, depends on the facts of each case.26  
The third element, the likelihood of confusion as to the source 
of the goods or service,27 is the most important element of 
trademark infringement.  This is because an important goal of 
trademark law is to prevent customer confusion as to the 
source of products (i.e., a competitor using a similar trademark 
to misappropriate the holder’s goodwill).28 
Courts will consider several factors in assessing the 
likelihood of confusion, the most common factors include the 
following: similarity of the trademarks, relatedness or 
proximity of the products or services, strength of the plaintiff’s 
mark, the relationship between the parties’ marketing 
channels, the degree of care likely to be exercised by 
consumers, actual confusion, and the defendant’s intent in 
selecting the trademark.29  These factors are pliant, in that 
 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053.  The statute 
states that: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, . . . uses 
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person 
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his 
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she 
is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) (2001). 
 28. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053.  The court 
described the purpose of trademark law as follows: 
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying 
mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchase 
decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that 
this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as 
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the 
past.  At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not 
an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product. 
Id. at 1053 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 
(1995)). 
 29. See Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76-77 (applying the 
Pignons test which weighs the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the 
goods, the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade, the relationship 
between the parties’ advertising, the classes of prospective purchasers, 
evidence of actual confusion, the defendant’s intent in adopting its mark, and 
the strength of the plaintiff’s mark); Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 
F.3d at 1054 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394 (9th Cir. 1997)) (applying the Sleekcraft factors, which include the 
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some are more important than others, and the relative 
importance of each factor will depend on the facts of the case.30  
Moreover, a likelihood of confusion can often be found after 
examining only a few of these factors.31 
 
b. The Similarity of the Trademarks 
 
Generally, the similarity of the trademarks should be 
evaluated “in their entirety and as they appear in the 
marketplace.”32  The greater the similarity between two marks, 
when considering the “sight, sound, and meaning”33 of the 
marks, the greater the likelihood of confusion. 
 
c. The Relatedness or Proximity of the Products or Services 
 
If the products or services are closely related, then it is 
more likely that the public will be confused as to which 
company supplies them.34  Courts should not place too much 
weight on the minute differences in the main lines of business: 
“[T]he relatedness of each company’s prime directive isn’t 
relevant.”35  What is relevant is whether the public is likely to, 
in some way, associate the defendant’s products or services 
 
similarity of marks, the relatedness of product offerings, the overlap in 
marketing and advertising channels, the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the 
intent of the defendant, evidence of actual confusion, likelihood of expansion in 
product lines, and consumer care); Metro Pub., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury 
News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying an eight factor test: (1) 
strength of alleged infringed mark; (2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 
(3) similarity of sight, sound, and meaning of the marks; (4) evidence of actual 
confusion; (5) degree of the marketing channels’ coverage; (6) type of goods and 
degree of consumer care; (7) intent of defendant; and (8) likelihood parties will 
expand their product lines). 
 30. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. See also Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76 (citing Calvin 
Klein Cosmetics Corp., v. Lenox Lab., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1987)).  In 
Calvin Klein Cosmetics, the court noted that “[a] realistic evaluation of 
consumer confusion must attempt to recreate the conditions in which buying 
decisions are made, and the court should try to determine not what it would 
do, but what a reasonable purchaser in market conditions would do.” 815 F.2d 
at 504. 
 33. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054 (citing Airline 
Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 34. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1056. 
 35. Id. (quoting Dreamworks Prod. Group v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 
1127,1131 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
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with those of the plaintiff.36  Although there may be some 
differences between the products or services, if these 
differences are obscured in the marketplace, a likelihood of 
confusion will exist.37 
 
d. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Trademark 
 
A trademark’s “strength” refers to “the distinctiveness of 
the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods 
sold under the mark as emanating from a particular . . . 
source.”38  The strength of a trademark is measured by the 
likelihood that the public will remember it and associate it with 
the trademark’s owner.39  Generally, the more money spent on 
advertising, the stronger the trademark becomes and the more 
protection it is entitled to.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36. See id.  Even though companies were not in direct competition, the 
nature and similarity of services provided would likely cause customer 
confusion.  See id.  For example, two companies might provide adult 
entertainment products and services.  See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. 
Supp.2d 639, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  Although one provides “hard core images” 
and the other “soft core images,” their principle line of business is the same.  
See id. In the case of guns and toys, the distinction is much greater and the 
likelihood of confusion is less.  See id. (holding that there was “no likelihood of 
confusion between ‘gunsrus.com’ firearms web site and ‘Toys ‘R’ Us’ 
trademark.”). 
 37. See Eli Lilly & Co., v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp.2d 834, 842 
(S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 38. See id. at 843. 
 39. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1058. 
 40. See id.  See also Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 79 (noting 
that the stronger the trademark, the more protection it is entitled to).  
According to Alta Vista Corp., there are five factors that can be considered in 
determining the strength of a mark.  See id.  Those factors are: (1) whether the 
mark was registered, (2) whether it was used for a long time, (3) whether it 
was widely advertised, (4) whether it was well-known in its field of business, 
and (5) whether it has a strong “secondary meaning.”  See id.  See also Digital 
Equipment Corp. v. Alta Vista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 478 (D. 
Mass. 1997); see, e.g., Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 80 (citing 
Winship Green, 103 F.3d 196, 206 (mentioning factors (1) and (3)); Star 
Financial, 89 F.3d 5,11 (mentioning factors (2), (3), and (4)); DeCosta v. 
Viacom Intern., Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (describing factor (5), and relying on 
factor (5)). 
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e. The Relationship Between the Parties’ Marketing 
Channels 
 
When the plaintiff and the defendant use the same 
marketing channels, a likelihood of confusion exists.  The 
likelihood of confusion only increases when the marketing or 
advertising channel used is the Internet because users can 
easily move from one web site to another, regardless of whether 
the web sites are related.41 
 
f. The Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by Consumers 
 
The degree of care likely to be exercised by each consumer 
is important in determining the likelihood of confusion.42  
Generally, the more expensive the product or service, the more 
careful the consumer will be in determining whose product or 
service he or she is seeking.43  Thus, the less expensive the 
product or service, the less careful the consumer will be and the 
likelihood of confusion will increase.44 
 
g. Actual Confusion 
 
If actual confusion can be demonstrated, then the 
likelihood of confusion is apparent; however, it is often difficult 
to prove that actual confusion exists.45  Generally, actual 
confusion need not be shown if other factors demonstrate a 
 
 41. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1057.  Web users are 
easily moved from one site to another (a click of the mouse) and are more 
likely to be confused as to who owns a site than “traditional patrons of a brick-
and-mortar store would be of a store’s ownership.” Id.  Examples of such 
confusion include: customers incorrectly believing that the defendants’ banner 
ads are sponsored by the plaintiff, that defendant’s companies licensed their 
images from plaintiff, or that they are related companies.  See id. 
 42. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1060.  The court also 
notes that “[t]he standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent 
purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer.” See id. 
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motors Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 283 (3rd Cir. 
1991)). 
 43. See id. (concluding that the reasonably prudent consumer is expected 
to be more careful and less easily confused when purchasing expensive items 
and when products or services are marketed to knowledgeable buyers). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1050.  The inability 
to prove actual confusion, however, is not required, because it is very difficult 
to prove.  See id. 
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likelihood of confusion.46 
 
h. The Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Trademark 
 
If it is found that the defendant intended to cause 
confusion, this may be the most important indicator of a 
likelihood of confusion.47  If an infringer has the “intent of 
deriving benefit from the reputation of the trade-mark or 
tradename, [the infringer’s] intent may be sufficient to justify 
the inference that there are confusing similarities.”48  Proof of 
the defendant’s intent to deceive the public also implies 
confusion.49  Although a finding of intent is strong evidence of 
confusion, the lack of intent is “largely irrelevant in 
determining if consumers likely will be confused as to source.”50 
While the above factors can be used to find a likelihood of 
confusion, there is an alternative theory to finding confusion.  
The alternative theory is known as initial interest confusion, 
which is the use of another’s trademark “in a manner 
calculated ‘to capture initial consumer attention, even though 
no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the 
confusion . . . .’”51  With respect to e-commerce, the harm to 
plaintiff is the probability that the user will subscribe to the 
competitor’s site because the user thought it was in some way 
connected to plaintiff’s site.  The competitor would thereby 
attract users based on the reputation and goodwill established 
by the plaintiff.52 
 
 
 46. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 844-45. 
 47. See id. at 845. 
 48. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1059. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. (quoting Daddy’s Junky Music Store, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family 
Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 287 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 51. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Dr. Seuss 
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
 52. See id. at 1063.  Actual or potential confusion is not required at the 
time of purchase, to find trademark infringement.  See id.  The issue is not the 
possibility that an online user would subscribe to the defendants’ advertisers’ 
sites thinking they were actually PEI’s sites or that they had some connection 
with PEI.  The harm to PEI, rather, is the likelihood that the online user, 
seeing the defendants’ advertisers’ banner ads and thinking they had some 
connection with PEI, would consider them on that basis alone.  The 
defendants’ advertisers would thus attract online users based solely on the 
reputation built up by PEI.  See id. 
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The Lanham Act protects against the diversion of a user’s 
initial interest.53  Many courts hold that initial interest 
confusion is actionable under the Lanham Act and that federal 
trademark and unfair competition laws protect against this 
kind of confusion.54  A plaintiff can prevail if it is shown that 
similarities between its products or services and defendant’s 
products or services mistakenly resulted in consumer belief 
that the companies were related.55 The plaintiff must further 
show that the confusion formed an interest in the defendant’s 
company’s products, which otherwise would not have existed.56  
Pre-sale confusion is actionable and generally occurs when “an 
infringing use is likely to attract potential customers based on 
the reputation of the owner of the mark.”57 
 
3. Trademark Dilution 
 
Trademark dilution58 occurs when a famous mark’s 
capacity to identify and distinguish its goods and services has 
been diminished.59  The goal of a trademark dilution claim is to 
prevent the distinctiveness of a holder’s trademark from being 
eroded by the sale of a competitor’s goods or services under an 
identical name.60  In order to prevail on a trademark dilution 
claim, the plaintiff must show that: 
 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1063 (citing, e.g., 
Green Prods., Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 
1076 (N.D. Iowa 1997)) (holding that ICBP profited from the  similarity 
between Green Products’ trademark and ICBP’s domain name, which lured 
customers onto its web site). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1063. 
 57. Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-
tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 243, 248-49 
(1998). 
 58. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), § 43 (c)(1) (2001).  This section 
states that: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of 
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a 
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become 
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to 
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. 
Id. 
 59. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. 
Supp.2d 1070, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2001). 
 60. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 847. 
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(1) [defendants have] made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to 
the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental 
association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to 
the famous mark’s economic value by lessening its former selling power 
as an advertising agent for its goods and services.61 
Trademark dilution usually occurs when the famous mark 
has been tarnished or blurred.62 Trademark tarnishment occurs 
when the plaintiff’s mark is “associated improperly with an 
inferior or offensive product or service.”63  Trademark blurring 
occurs when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to identify 
the defendant’s goods and services,64 because when consumers 
see plaintiff’s trademark on several different products or 
services, the trademark’s ability to identify the plaintiff’s 
product is weakened or diluted.65 
 
4. Irreparable Harm 
 
Irreparable harm is usually presumed in both trademark 
infringement and dilution claims when a likelihood of confusion 
is shown.66  If a plaintiff can show that there is a likelihood of 
confusion or that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits, 
courts should presume “irreparable harm from [the] deceptive 
comparative advertising.”67 
 
5. Balance of Harms 
 
A court will likely grant an injunction, if in light of the 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits, the harm to the plaintiff 
without the injunction exceeds the harm to the defendant with 
the injunction.68 
 
 61. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1075. 
 62. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 851. 
 63. Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1075.  See also Eli Lilly & Co., 
86 F. Supp.2d. at 851 (noting that trademark tarnishment occurs when a 
trademark is associated with poor quality products, “portrayed in an 
unwholesome light,” or can no longer be a “wholesome identifier” of the 
plaintiff’s product). 
 64. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 851. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  See also Metro Pub., 987 
F.2d at 640. 
 67. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  See also Metro Pub., 987 
F.2d at 640; Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11-12 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
 68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
2001] BANNER AD KEYING 173 
 
 
6. Public Interest 
 
If a likelihood of confusion is shown, courts will presume 
that it is in the public interest to grant the injunction.  The 
public interest favors enforcing the trademark laws in order to 
prevent confusion because society values fair competition and 
the protection of trade names.69 
 
B. RELATED ISSUES 
 
A web site that is rarely visited does not provide a lot of 
value to the business that created the site.  Consequently, 
nearly every business with a web site seeks to increase the 
number of visits to its web site.  With the rapid growth of e-
commerce has come an increase in the competition for 
attention.70  This section discusses some of the practices used to 
attract attention and the related legal issues. 
 
1. Meta-tags 
 
Although some consumers find web sites by memorizing 
their URLs and typing them into the browser directly,71 most 
consumers find web sites via search engines, such as Excite, 
Lycos, or Hotbot.  Many search engines will use a meta-tag’s 
name and attributes to create an index of World Wide Web 
pages.72  When a search engine user keys in a word or phrase 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Bruce E.H. Johnson, Regulatory Update: Internet Sheriffs 
Approach the Electronic Frontier, 579 PLI/Pat 67, 85 (1999). 
 71. See id.  This usually only occurs with respect to well-known web sites 
such as www.etrade.com, www.amazon.com, or www.espn.com. 
 72. See id. at 87.  Generally: 
[a] Web page is a text file with instructions that tells a browser such as 
Internet Explorer or Netscape how to display its contents.  These 
instructions for the browser are, for the most part, . . . given in the form 
of certain “tags” or elements which are strings of text in between 
brackets like <and>. 
Id. at 86.  For example, “the tag that tells a browser to display text in bold is 
<b>: the instruction <b>Some random text</b> instructs the browser to 
display the phrase ‘Some Random Text’ in bold.”  Id.  The tag that causes 
trademark infringement and dilution problems is <meta>, which is contained 
in the “head” of the HTML page.  Purveyors of adult entertainment can use 
the meta-tag as follows: <META NAME=“keywords” CONTENT=“Playboy, 
Playmate, etc.”>, even though it actually is not related to PEI and does not sell 
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and runs the search, the search engine will search its index for 
the web sites that contain such word or phrase.73  The meta-
tag’s name and attributes can have a significant effect on the 
search engines;74 the meta-tag determines how high on the 
relevancy ranking a company’s web site address will be relative 
to other web sites on the search results page.75  Thus, meta-tags 
are important in the digital marketplace because they assist 
on-line users in arriving at their desired web sites.  A business 
can encode its web sites with meta-tags of the company’s name, 
products or services, which allows customers to easily find the 
business’s web site.  However, companies have also found ways 
to abuse the use of meta-tags.76 
Two questionable methods of generating attention to the 
web sites are: (1) burying certain code in the meta-tag to 
confuse search engines as to the source or content of a web 
site,77 and (2) manipulating the content of the meta-tags so that 
web site owners can get favorable positioning on the search 
results page.78  Moreover, courts have consistently held that the 
embedding of a competitor’s trademarks into one’s meta-tag 
can be trademark infringement.79  The Lanham Act provides a 
 
PEI products.  When the search engine searches its index, it will list this site 
along with PEI’s on the search results page, even though, this site has nothing 
to do with PEI.  See id. 
 73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 86.  Johnson quotes another author 
stating that “[w]hen encountered by any of the popular search engines on the 
Web, these keywords [in the meta tags] will be used to categorize the 
document.  If you want your documents to be indexed by a search engine, 
consider putting this kind of tag [at the top] of each document.” Id. at 87. 
 75. See id.  Basically, the meta-tags determine whether the web site is 
ranked 1-10, or 100-110.  Usually consumers will only look at the first few 
listed web-sites. 
 76. See id. 
 77. For example, a purveyor of adult entertainment can put “playboy” and 
“playmate” in its meta-tag, and when a user searching for PEI’s web site keys 
in either “playboy” or “playmate,” the web site of the purveyor of adult 
entertainment will appear next to or close to PEI’s web site, even though the 
former’s web site is unrelated to PEI and has nothing to do with it.  See 
Johnson, supra note 70, at 86. 
 78. For example, a purveyor of adult entertainment can put “playboy, 
playboy, playboy” and “playmate, playmate, playmate” in its meta-tag; when 
the search engine looks for the word “playboy” or “playmate,” it will find this 
site and list it at the top of the search results page.  The search engine ranks 
the web sites according to the number of “hits” (times it finds the words 
“playboy” or “playmate”).  See id. at 87. 
 79. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064 (citing Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL 724000, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 10, 1998)) (concluding that AsiaFocus’s use of words “Playboy” and 
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cause of action against one who uses a mark in commerce that 
will likely cause confusion concerning the source of the 
products or services offered.80  In fact, it appears that the 
Lanham Act prohibits the use of “any term confusingly similar 
with [another’s trademark]” in one’s meta-tags not comporting 
with the fair use doctrine under the Lanham Act.81 
The Lanham Act does permit the truthful use of a 
competitor’s mark to identify the competitor’s products or 
services and in comparative advertisements,82 but a 
presumption of unfair use of a trademark accompanies the use 
of a trademark in a meta-tag.83  However, in Playboy Enters., 
Inc.,84 Welles’ web site minimized the use of Playboy’s 
trademark and contained disclaimers stating that the site was 
not affiliated with Playboy. The Ninth Circuit held that 
Welles’s used the words “playboy” and “playmate” as 
descriptive words, not as trademarks, and that the use was a 
“good faith attempt to index the content of her web site.”85  
Thus the court concluded her use of the words in her meta-tags 
constituted fair use.86 
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sections 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4), 
the defendant has a fair use defense when the use of another’s 
mark “also describes a person, place, or an attribute of a 
product.”87  The fair use defense prohibits a trademark holder 
 
“Playmate” in its HTML code “intentionally misled viewers into believing that 
its Web site was connected with, or sponsored by Playboy.”); Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
(finding that Playboy had shown a success on its merits in its claim that 
Calvin Designer Label’s use of the word playboy in its meta-tags constituted 
trademark infringement, and consequently enjoining Calvin Designer Label 
from using Playboy’s trademarks in its buried code or meta-tags).  Cf. Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the 
defendant, a Playboy “Playmate of the Year,” was entitled to use of her title in 
her web site’s “meta-tag”). 
 80. See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1036. 
 81. See id. at 1065. 
 82. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
306-09 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 83. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pound’s USA, Co., 125 
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) that “fair use is a use, 
otherwise than as a mark, of a term or device that is descriptive of and used 
fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of a party”). 
 84. 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 85. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 
1998). 
 86. See id. 
 87. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 302, (9th Cir.1992).  See also 15 
U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2001).  When the “mark is used only to ‘describe the goods 
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from appropriating a term for his own exclusive use, thereby 
preventing others from properly and in good faith describing 
the character of their goods or services.88  A plaintiff must 
overcome the fair use defense before a violation of section 43(a) 
or 43(c) of the Lanham Act may be found.89 
 
2. Domain Names 
 
A domain name serves as a company’s on-line address and 
is also subject to abuse by competitors.90  Such abuse can occur 
when a competitor uses a company’s trademark(s) in its own 
domain name, so as to confuse consumers into believing that 
the competitor is in some way associated with the company.91  
This type of use has been held to be a misappropriation of a 
company’s goodwill.92  In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin 
Designer Label, the court held that the defendant could not use 
the domain names: “www.playboyxxx.com” or 
“www.playmatelive.com.”93  The court decided that, among 
other things, PEI was likely to prove trademark infringement 
based on defendant’s use of the trademarks in its domain 
name.94  The court also ordered the defendant to cease: (1) 
using PEI’s trademark in any domain name; (2) using PEI’s 
trademark in connection with defendant’s good or services 
which would cause an erroneous belief that it was associated 
with the mark; (3) using any web sites, advertisements, or 
Internet codes that are so similar to PEI’s mark as to cause 
consumer confusion; and (4) engaging in activities which could 
cause consumers to believe that PEI sponsored or authorized 
 
or services of [a] party, geographic origin,’ trademark law recognizes a ‘fair 
use’ defense,” which states the following: 
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement 
is a use otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his 
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such 
party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and 
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their 
geographic origin . . . . 
See id. 
 88. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 F. Supp.2d at 1103. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
 91. See id. at 1220. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 1221. 
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such activities.95 
 
3. Free Riding 
 
One of the goals of trademark law is to prevent companies 
from free riding on their rivals’ trademarks and thus 
capitalizing on their rival’s investments in time and money.96  A 
trademark holder’s rivals have much incentive to “tread closely 
on the heels of [a] very successful trademark” (i.e., it is cheaper 
selling the product in an established market, without 
advertising costs, etc.).97  Trademark holders are given the right 
to enjoin others from continuing such misrepresentations.98  
Without the trademark holder’s right to prevent 
misrepresentations, rival companies could “induce customers to 
select their goods when the customers meant to select the goods 
of the company that created the mark.”99  Thus, without 
protection from the law, there is no incentive to develop new 
products and services, which harms consumers.100  
Furthermore, the Lanham Act gives a strong mark greater 
protection from free riders than it does to a weaker mark; a 
strong mark may increase the likelihood of confusion, since 
consumers may be less careful when purchasing a product with 
a strong mark.101 
In the digital world, free riding may be one of the biggest 
concerns facing companies today.  Free riding is much easier on 
the Internet, as opposed to in the “bricks and mortar” world, 
simply because of the way information is used.  Meta-tags, 
domain names, and banner ads all allow potential free riding 
 
 95. See id. at 1222. 
 96. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306; Weight Watchers Int’l, 
Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1990). 
 97. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 
350 at 352 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 98. See TMT North America, Inc. v. Magic Touch, 124 F.3d 876, 881-82 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See TMT North America, Inc., 124 F.3d at 882 (citing William A. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (stating “[i]f the law does not prevent it, free 
riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark 
in the first place.”)). 
 101. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc., 963 F.2d at 353 (concluding that the 
“Lanham Act’s tolerance for similarity between competing marks varies 
inversely with the fame of the prior mark.  As a mark’s fame increases, the 
Act’s tolerance for similarities in competing marks falls.”). 
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by competitors, if they are not duly restricted.102 
 
4. Trademark Vigilance 
 
The court’s holding in the instant case may make it harder 
for companies to defend their trademarks against potential 
infringement by making it harder to exercise trademark 
vigilance.  Trademark vigilance is a company’s ongoing process 
of detecting and fighting trademark infringement.103  The 
purpose of trademark vigilance is to prevent a strong mark 
from becoming weak.104  Effective vigilance will protect and 
strengthen the trademark.105  It is important to be vigilant 
especially in a market where there are many infringers, 
because if a company is not vigilant it may lose its rights to a 
trademark.106  Moreover, a company’s ability to show that it 
 
 102. Meta-Tags: A defendant free rides off plaintiff’s trademark when 
defendant uses plaintiff’s trademark to attract customers.  For example, free 
riding occurs if D incorporates P’s trademark into D’s meta-tags.  This 
happens when C, using a search engine to find P’s product, types in P’s 
trademark, arrives at a search results page with D’s web site address listed 
near or before P’s web site, and chooses D’s web site, rather than P’s web site. 
Domain names: A defendant can free ride off plaintiff’s trademark by using 
plaintiff’s trademark within defendant’s domain name in order to attract 
customers.  A popular way of searching for a particular web site is to type in 
“www.(name of the company/product).com.”  For example, free riding occurs if 
D uses P’s trademark in D’s domain name, for instance: “www.P.com,” and if C 
doesn’t know P’s domain name, but guesses that it is “www.P.com,” C will be 
taken to D’s web site, rather than P’s web site. 
Banner Ads: A defendant can free ride off plaintiff’s trademark by using the 
trademark in defendant’s banner ads in order to attract customers’ business.  
For example, free riding occurs if D uses P’s trademark in D’s banner ads, as a 
“trigger” for the ad, when C, using a search engine, keys in P’s trademark, D’s 
banner ad appears on the search results page, and C, believing the banner ad 
to be P’s banner ad, clicks on it, is taken to D’s web site. 
 103. Peter S. Sloane, Trademark Vigilance in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Pragmatic Approach, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 823, 827 
(1999).  See also id. at 840 (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 
F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992)).  In order for a company to preserve its 
trademark rights it must proactively and reactively stop other companies from 
infringing upon its trademark; this is especially important when the infringer 
operates in the same market or business area.  See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 831, 840.  The more vigilant a company 
is, the stronger its mark will be, thus the less likely that the distinctiveness of 
its mark will be diluted, and the less likely such infringement will lead to 
abandonment.  See id. 
 106. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 837, 839 (noting that terms such as 
aspirin and cellophane became generic because their trademark status was 
not preserved by their owners). 
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pursues infringers can often persuade a judge that the 
company’s trademark deserves to be protected and that a 
preliminary injunction should be granted.107 
Another goal of trademark vigilance is to prevent a strong 
mark from becoming generic.108  If a trademark becomes generic 
it is no longer entitled to trademark protection.109  A trademark 
can become generic when the public “decides to use the 
trademark to designate not the particular manufacturer’s 
brand but the entire product comprising all the competing 
brands”110 or when the public “comes to understand the mark to 
refer only to the kind of goods and not to the origin”111 of the 
goods. 
 
5. Internet Regulation Generally 
 
The Internet is a “unique and wholly new medium of 
worldwide human communication,”112 and courts should be 
careful when attempting to apply established law to Internet 
regulation.113  In order to facilitate the development of e-
commerce, laws must be applied in light of the realities of the 
digital marketplace.114  Moreover, in this context, courts must 
not be too rigid in applying the law; a flexible approach is 
necessary when dealing with emerging technologies.115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107. See id. at 840.  (noting that an element of a preliminary injunction is a 
showing of irreparable harm, and that it is difficult to show this if the 
company allows others to infringe upon its mark). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.  Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 
577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 
198, 211 (D. Md. 1988). 
 112. Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. 
Supp.2d 1070, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054.  See also 
supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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II. CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
The District Court held that PEI failed to show that 
defendants used its trademarks in commerce.116  The court 
found that “an Internet user cannot conduct a search using the 
trademark form of the words, i.e., Playboy and Playmate.”117  
Accordingly, it held only the generic, English form of the words, 
i.e., “playboy” and “playmate,” could be used for Internet 
searches, and consequently, the defendants were not using 
PEI’s trademarks in their banner ad packages.118  The court 
concluded that since the defendants did not use PEI’s 
trademarks in commerce, there was no trademark 
infringement. 119 
The court next assumed that the defendants did use PEI’s 
trademarks, but held that PEI failed to demonstrate that the 
use was a violation of the trademark laws.120  With respect to 
the trademark infringement claim, the court found that PEI 
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.121  PEI 
attempted to demonstrate the requisite confusion by proposing 
that the defendant’s use of its trademarks “Playboy” and 
“Playmate” caused initial interest confusion.122  The court 
argued, however, that there could be no confusion because “[a]s 
English words, ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ cannot be said to 
suggest sponsorship or endorsement of either the web sites that 
appear as search results . . . or the banner ads that adorn the 
search results page.”123  The court then stated that although the 
trademarked words were identical to generic, English words, 
PEI could not remove words from the English language by 
acquiring a trademark right in the word.124  Thus, it concluded 
that PEI failed to establish that the defendants and the users 
of the search engine were using  PEI’s trademarked words, as 
opposed to their generic, English word counterparts.125 
 
 
 116. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076. 
 117. Id. at 1073. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 1074. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
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The District Court also held that PEI failed to establish 
that there was trademark dilution, because PEI failed to 
demonstrate that its trademark was blurred or tarnished.126  
The court again alluded to the fact that defendants used the 
words as generic, English words and not as PEI’s 
trademarks.127  As to whether the trademarks were blurred, the 
court noted that PEI did not show that defendants’ use of the 
words “playboy” and “playmate” “caused any severance of the 
association between [PEI] and its trademarks Playboy® and 
Playmate® . . . .”128  Thus the court held that PEI failed to 
establish that the trademarks had been blurred.129  With 
respect to the tarnishment argument, the court held that PEI 
failed to show trademark tarnishment because defendants used 
the generic words “playboy” and “playmate,” as opposed to the 
trademarked versions, and as such there could not be any 
trademark tarnishment.130  The court further reasoned that 
even if defendants used PEI’s trademarked words, PEI would 
have to demonstrate that its mark would be harmed by the 
association with other “purveyors of adult entertainment.” 131  
The court held that PEI failed to meet this burden.132 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The District Court’s reasoning and application of 
traditional trademark law was much too narrow and stringent 
for the digital world.  The court focused almost entirely on 
whether the words used were PEI’s trademarks or if they were 
merely generic, English words, and failed to see the underlying 
economic realities of the case before it.  Had the court 
considered such realities, it would have recognized that the 
defendants were using the information structure of the 
Internet to misappropriate PEI’s goodwill through their 
abusive use of banner ads. 
 
 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. at 1075. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. at 1076.  The court noted that PEI could not show harm 
because its trademarks are already associated with “purveyors of adult 
entertainment” in other marketing channels, (i.e. adult bookstores).  See id. 
 132. See id. 
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The District Court’s holding hinged almost entirely on its 
finding that the defendants merely used generic, English words 
as opposed to PEI’s trademarks.133  Had the court correctly 
analyzed this aspect of the case it would have granted PEI the 
injunction.134  The court held that only generic, English words 
could be used on the search engines.135  Admittedly, one cannot 
conduct a search by keying in a trademark per se, but that is, 
in effect, what happened.  Both the advertisers and the 
defendants knew this and counted on it.  The defendants 
bundled those terms with over 450 other words relating to 
adult entertainment into a package to be marketed to 
purveyors of adult entertainment;136 this allowed advertisers to 
“maximize the efficacy of their ads by targeting consumers 
matching a certain demographic profile.”137  However, the 
generic, English meanings of the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” are not at all related to adult entertainment: the 
definition of the word “playboy” is “a man who pursues a life of 
pleasure without responsibility or attachments”138 and the word 
“playmate” is defined as “a companion, esp. of a child, in play or 
recreation.”139  Only the trademarked versions of these words 
are related to adult entertainment.  Given the defendants’ and 
advertisers’ motive, to target consumers of adult 
entertainment, it is likely that the defendants and advertisers 
intended to use the trademarked version of the words. 
Two examples, in which the trademarked version of the 
words “playboy” or “playmate” were used instead of the generic, 
English versions, appear in the analysis of cases involving 
domain names and meta-tags.  In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Calvin Designer Label, PEI sought to enjoin the defendant from 
using the domain names: “www.playboyxxx.com” and 
“www.playmatelive.com.”140  The court found that the defendant 
was using PEI’s trademarks and conducted an extensive 
 
 133. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 134. See id.  Concerning the trademark dilution claim, the District Court 
was correct in determining that PEI could not show trademark tarnishment; 
however, the court erred in determining that trademark blurring could not be 
shown. 
 135. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1081. 
 136. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076. 
 138. WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY  607 (College Ed. 1997). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
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trademark infringement analysis.141  The Court held that it was 
likely that PEI could prove trademark infringement based on 
the defendant’s use of PEI’s trademarks in its domain names 
and properly awarded the injunction.142  Yet, the District Court 
in the instant case would have such use of the word “playmate” 
in “www.playmatelive.com” or “playboy” in 
“www.playboyxxx.com” to be a valid use because the words are 
merely generic, English words.  Furthermore, in Playboy v. 
Welles, defendant Welles used the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” in the meta-tags to her web site.143  The court first 
went through the trademark infringement analysis and then it 
conducted a lengthy analysis of the fair use of PEI’s 
trademarks by Welles.144  Presumably, the court thought that 
the trademarked versions of the words were being used and not 
their generic, English counterparts, or it would not have gone 
through such analyses.  Again, under the present court’s 
rationale, PEI would not have been afforded any protection.  If 
the words “playboy” and “playmate” are recognized as being 
trademarks with respect to domain names and meta-tags, for 
the law to be consistently applied, they should also be 
recognized as trademarks with respect to banner ad use. 
If the instant court’s analysis were to stand, then the 
purpose behind the trademark laws is effectively undermined.  
PEI would not be able to protect the distinctiveness of its 
trademarks simply because they are generic, English words.145  
The court stated that PEI cannot trademark words out of the 
English language.146  Strictly speaking, no, PEI cannot 
trademark words out of the English language, but this can 
create a harsh and unintended result.  The court’s reasoning, 
taken to its logical conclusion, would render PEI unable to 
protect its trademarks under any circumstances. This case 
 
 141. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 
1998) (holding that defendant is entitled to a “fair use” defense to plaintiff’s 
trademark claim for use of meta-tags “playboy” and “playmate”), and Playboy 
Enters., Inc., v. Asiafocus, 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. April 10, 1998) (holding 
that the defendant’s use of PEI’s trademarks in its meta-tags was a violation 
of the federal trademark laws), with Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 
1070 (holding that defendants did not use PEI’s trademarks but rather the 
common English words “playboy” and “playmate”). 
 144. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1102-04 (S.D. 
Cal. 1998). 
 145. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 146. See id. 
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would also effectively overrule the Welles and Calvin Designer 
Label cases, which held that PEI’s trademarks, as opposed to 
generic, English words, were used by the defendants.147 
In addition, when evaluating the likelihood of confusion, 
the relevant confusion is that experienced by consumers — it is 
a subjective inquiry.148  Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the 
court believes that only the generic words can be used on the 
search engine.149  The relevant question is what the consumer 
believes he or she is searching for.150  If the consumer is 
searching for something other than adult entertainment, and 
intends to use the generic, English versions of the words, then 
the banner ads would cause little or no likelihood of confusion.  
The user would presumably ignore the banner ads, as well as 
PEI’s web sites, and thus there would be no violation of the 
trademark laws.  However, if the consumer is looking for adult 
entertainment, he or she intends to use the trademarked 
version of the words, and by including these words in their 
advertising packages, the defendants are effectively using PEI’s 
trademarks. 
Finally, because the Internet is a vast, new medium of 
communication and commerce,151 courts should use caution 
when trying to apply established doctrines of law to it.152  This 
court, by holding that the defendants used only the generic, 
English versions of the words, chose form over substance, and 
given the realities of e-commerce, this is an overly-rigid 
application of the law.153  For the foregoing reasons, the court 
erred in holding that the defendants did not use PEI’s 
trademark to market its product. 
 
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
 
PEI should succeed on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction if the words “playboy” and “playmate” were used as 
PEI’s trademarks.  To prevail on such a motion, PEI must show 
that (1) without an injunction it would suffer irreparable 
injury, (2) the scales of hardship tip in its favor, (3) it is likely 
 
 147. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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to succeed on the merits, and (4) it is in the public interest to 
grant the injunction.154 
In order for PEI to demonstrate a likelihood of success on 
the merits it must show three things: (1) its trademark is valid, 
(2) the defendant is using the trademark, and (3) such use 
harms PEI because it is likely to cause customer confusion.155  
PEI’s registration of its trademark “Playboy” and “Playmate” 
with the Principal Register in the Patent and Trademark office 
establishes that its trademark is valid.156  As explained above, 
defendants were using PEI’s trademark.  Thus, PEI need only 
demonstrate that such use would likely cause consumer 
confusion to succeed on the merits of its claim. 
A court may consider the factors discussed below to 
determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.157 
 
1. Similarity of the Trademarks 
 
The words that the defendants used were “playboy” and 
“playmate” the words that PEI has trademarked are “Playboy” 
and “Playmate.”158  The similarities are so close that it is highly 
likely that reasonable consumers would confuse the two.159  In 
fact, when using the defendants’ search engine, a banner ad for 
purveyors of adult entertainment would appear regardless of 
whether the user keyed in the word with a capital P or a 
lowercase p.160  As a result, this factor greatly weighs in favor of 
finding a likelihood of confusion. 
 
2. Relatedness or Proximity of the Products or Services 
 
Both PEI and the advertisers who purchased the 
defendants’ services provided on-line adult entertainment for a 
fee, and they competed for the same types of Internet users 
(those seeking adult entertainment).161  Concededly, the 
defendants’ advertisers provided more explicit and “hardcore” 
products and services than PEI, but the proximity of the 
 
 154. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 26. 
 158. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
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services is undeniable.162  Because the services offered by both 
PEI and the defendants’ advertisers are closely related, it is 
likely that consumers could, in some way, associate the 
defendants’ advertisers with PEI.163  Thus, this factor also 
favors the finding that there was a likelihood of consumer 
confusion. 
 
3. Strength of the Plaintiff’s Mark 
 
Generally, the stronger the trademark is the more 
protection it is entitled.164  PEI’s marks were registered, used 
for a long time, widely advertised, well known in its industry, 
and had a descriptive secondary meaning.165  All of the above 
suggest that the mark is a strong one, and as such is entitled to 
a great deal of protection.166  In addition, because PEI’s 
trademarks are so well known and its services so diverse, 
consumers may be confused as to what services it actually 
offers.167  If a banner ad displaying adult entertainment-related 
content appears when the user searches for PEI’s services, the 
consumer may mistake the advertiser’s services for PEI’s 
services. 
 
4. The Relationship Between the Parties’ Marketing 
Channels 
 
Because the defendant’s advertisers advertised on the 
Internet, the likelihood of confusion is increased.168  Moreover, 
it is much easier to become confused as to what the source of 
the banner ad is when the defendants’ advertisers place their 
advertisements on PEI’s search results page, especially since 
PEI and the advertisers have overlapping audiences.169 
 
 
 
 
 162. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 169. See id. 
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5. The Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by Consumers 
 
Because the services provided by both PEI and the 
defendants’ advertisers are relatively inexpensive, consumers 
will likely be less discerning and more easily confused by the 
defendants’ use of PEI’s trademarks.170 
 
6. The Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Trademark 
 
The defendants chose to include the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” in its group of 450 words related to adult 
entertainment because PEI is well known in the adult 
entertainment industry.  The defendants intended to use PEI’s 
trademark and reputation to help target the demographic 
profile that their advertisers were seeking.171  As stated before, 
the ordinary meaning of these words has nothing to do with 
adult entertainment, and the fact that they were grouped with 
the other 450 words related to adult entertainment indicates 
that the defendants intended to use PEI’s reputation and 
trademarks to sell their product.172  This factor weighs in favor 
of PEI in that it appears as though the defendants intended to 
cause some consumer confusion. 
 
7. Actual Confusion 
 
Although actual confusion was not shown here, this alone 
does not prevent a plaintiff from prevailing when the other 
factors point to a likelihood of confusion.173 
After considering the above factors, it appears that PEI can 
successfully demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. 
PEI would also likely establish that the defendants created 
initial interest confusion, the alternative method of 
establishing a likelihood of confusion.174  Initial interest 
confusion  “occurs when a competitor lures potential customers 
by initially passing off its goods as those of another, even if 
confusion as to the source of goods is dispelled by the time the 
 
 170. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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sales are completed.”175  By including the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” in their advertising packages, defendants enabled 
other adult entertainment companies to lure customers to their 
sites by initially passing off their sites as PEI’s site or related 
to PEI.176  The initial interest confusion occurs when search 
engine users key-in “playboy” or “playmate” looking for PEI or 
PEI related sites, and find a banner ad on the search results 
page.  Because both PEI and the banner ad provide on-line 
adult entertainment, the user may initially believe the banner 
ad is PEI’s or connected with PEI.  Even if the user goes to the 
advertisers’ site and discovers that it is not PEI’s site or 
connected with PEI, the initial confusion as to whom the 
advertisement was for, is enough to be actionable under the 
doctrine of initial interest confusion.177 
The defendants are essentially using PEI’s reputation to 
attract new customers.  This type of activity is prohibited by 
federal trademark laws, as well as unfair competition laws.178  
The concern is that once a user is at the defendants’ 
advertisers’ web site he or she will be content with staying on 
that site instead of continuing to search for PEI’s web site.  
Moreover, as explained above, with respect to less expensive 
products, the degree of consumer care may be correspondingly 
lower.179  When the user searching for PEI’s site sees a banner 
ad advertising adult entertainment, he or she may immediately 
“click” on the banner ad assuming that it is related to PEI.180  
Thus, PEI can demonstrate  a likelihood of confusion by either 
applying the factors listed above or by using the theory of 
initial interest confusion. 
By possessing valid trademarks and showing that the 
defendants used the trademarks, and by establishing a 
likelihood of confusion, it is likely that PEI would succeed on 
the merits of the case.  However, in order to win on the motion 
for an injunction, the court must find that the relative harm to 
PEI, if the injunction is denied, exceeds the harm to the 
defendants if the injunction is granted.181  If the motion is 
granted, the cost to the defendants is minimal; they will merely 
 
 175. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 845. 
 176. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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sell their package to advertisers minus the words “playboy” and 
“playmate.”  The defendants may incur some reprogramming 
and recall fees, but in total, the cost is de minimus.  They will 
probably continue to sell as many packages to advertisers as 
before.  In contrast, if the injunction is denied, the cost to PEI 
will be much greater.  PEI would see a decrease in the number 
of users of its web site (and the resulting business) and, more 
importantly, a decrease in the strength of two of its main 
trademarks, or the risk of those marks becoming generic.182  
PEI has spent the last fifty years and millions of dollars 
creating a name for itself and building up goodwill,183 and if the 
court denies the injunction, it could all be for nothing if PEI’s 
trademarks become generic or weaker.  Consequently, it 
appears as though the scales of hardship will tip in favor of 
PEI. 
Thus, PEI can both establish a likelihood of success on the 
merits and show undue hardship; this, along with the 
presumption of suffering irreparable harm and being in the 
public interest, should be sufficient for the court to have 
granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on the 
trademark infringement claim. 
 
B. TRADEMARK DILUTION ANALYSIS 
 
PEI also alleged that placing banner ads for other 
purveyors of adult entertainment on PEI’s search results page 
tarnishes or dilutes PEI’s trademarks.184  PEI argued that 
defendants’ banner ads diminished PEI’s ability to distinguish 
and identify its goods.185  Trademark dilution occurs when (1) 
defendants’ used trademarks that are sufficiently similar to 
PEI’s trademarks as to cause a consumer mental association of 
the two that (2) caused (3) actual economic harm to PEI’s 
trademarks’ economic value by decreasing its selling power as 
an advertising agent for PEI’s goods and services.186  “The 
prohibition on dilution is intended to ‘protect the trademark 
 
 182. See supra Section I(B)(4): Trademark Dilution Analysis (explaining 
how a trademark becomes generic). 
 183. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. 
Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 184. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2001); Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 
1075. 
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owner from the erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a 
trademark caused by the sale of other goods or services under 
the same name . . . , even though there is no confusion as to 
source.’”187  It is highly likely that the defendants’ use of PEI’s 
trademark to create a banner ad on PEI’s search results page 
caused a consumer to make a mental association between the 
two products or services.  As mentioned earlier, PEI is one of 
the largest providers of adult entertainment, and it provides 
many services; a banner ad appearing on PEI’s search results 
page could reasonably lead consumers to believe that it was 
related to PEI.188  Whether or not this association between the 
banner ads and PEI caused PEI’s trademark to lose economic 
value depends on whether such banner ads tarnished or 
blurred PEI’s trademarks.189 
Trademark tarnishment would occur if PEI’s trademarks 
were improperly associated with an inferior or offensive 
product or service.190  However, the defendants did not tarnish 
PEI’s trademarks by linking them to the banner ads.191  PEI 
claimed that the banner ads advertised explicit and hardcore 
adult entertainment, which, because of the link to PEI’s 
trademarks, improperly associated the trademarks with an 
inferior or offensive product or service.192  Yet, PEI’s magazines 
are often in adult bookstores, which carry explicit and hardcore 
adult entertainment; this fact tends to undermine PEI’s 
tarnishment argument.193 
Trademark blurring would occur if the defendants used 
PEI’s trademarks to identify the defendants’ goods and 
services.194  PEI’s trademarks were blurred by the banner ads: 
“[d]ilution by blurring occurs where customers or prospective 
customers see the plaintiff’s mark on a ‘plethora of different 
goods and services,’ thus potentially diluting and weakening 
the mark’s ability to serve as a unique identifier of one source – 
 
 187. Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 847 (citing Illinois High School Ass’n 
v. GTE Vontage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 188. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076. 
 189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 190. See id.  See also Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 851 (noting that 
trademark tarnishment occurs when a trademark is associated with poor 
quality products, portrayed in an unwholesome light, or can no longer be a 
“wholesome identifier” of the plaintiff’s products). 
 191. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1072. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 1076. 
 194. See id. at 1075. 
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the plaintiff’s product.”195  By linking the ads of other adult 
entertainment providers to PEI’s trademark, the defendants 
caused their search engine users to associate PEI’s mark with 
the web sites of the other providers of adult entertainment.196  
PEI is likely to succeed on the merits of the trademark dilution 
claim because it can establish that the defendants’ use of the 
words “playboy” and “playmate” in their advertisement 
packages would cause a mental association with PEI’s marks, 
which would cause economic harm to PEI’s trademarks. 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act grants preliminary 
injunctive relief when it is demonstrated that (1) the plaintiff 
will likely succeed on the merits, (2) absent an injunction the 
plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury, (3) the scale of hardship 
tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) it is in the public interest to 
grant the injunction.197  The fact that it is likely that PEI would 
succeed on the merits with regard to the trademark dilution 
claim would tip the scales of hardship in PEI’s favor.198  This 
combined with the presumptions that without the injunction 
PEI would suffer irreparable harm199 and that it is in the public 
interest to grant the injunction,200 leads to the conclusion that 
PEI should have been granted a motion for a preliminary 
injunction for the trademark dilution claim. 
The District Court failed to reach the correct decision with 
respect to both the trademark dilution claim and the 
trademark infringement claim.  Thus, because the defendant 
infringed on and diluted PEI’s trademarks, a preliminary 
injunction should have been granted on these grounds. 
 
C. LEGALITY OF BANNER ADS ANALYSIS 
 
Having established that the defendants’ use of the banner 
ads infringed on and diluted PEI’s trademarks, this section will 
now set forth legal, economic, and policy reasons for why the 
use of banner ad keying should be restricted.  First, this section 
 
 195. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 851. 
 196. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1072. 
 197. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra Section III(B): Trademark Dilution Analysis. 
 199. See Alta Vista Corp.Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 75 (citing Camel Hair and 
Cashmere Inst. of America, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 12 
(1st Cir. 1986)). 
 200. See id. (citing Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Products, Inc., 832 F.2d 
697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)).  See also Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village 
Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1015 (D. Mass. 1988). 
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will analogize the practice of banner ad keying with the 
practice of meta-tag use, and argue that it should be restricted 
in the same way meta-tag use has been restricted.  Second, it 
will examine economic reasons for restricting the practice of 
banner ad keying.  Third, it will consider policy reasons for 
restricting the practice of banner ad keying. 
 
1. Legal Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner Ad 
Keying 
 
Banner ads, especially as they are offered by the 
defendants, are the functional equivalent of a meta-tag.  To 
compare the illegal use of meta-tags to the illegal use of banner 
ads,201 this comment will use the facts of Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Asiafocus Int’l, Inc. and the facts of Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Netscape Communications, Inc.  Asiafocus was a company that 
primarily sold adult entertainment products.202  The company 
embedded PEI’s trademarks into its meta-tags such that when 
a search engine user keyed in the word “playboy” or 
“playmate,” Asiafocus’ web site address would appear near 
PEI’s web site address.203  Asiafocus was found to have 
“purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers 
to their Web site under the guise that their sites are sponsored 
by or somehow affiliated with PEI.”204  Similarly, the banner 
ads set up by Netscape, Excite, and the purveyors of adult 
entertainment, are also triggered by the words “playboy” and 
“playmate.”205  When such words are keyed in by a search 
engine user, the search engine, like in a meta-tag scenario, will 
search for the words in its index.206  The difference though, is 
that instead of searching its entire World Wide Web index, as it 
 
 201. Not all use of meta-tags or banner ads is illegal.  See Brian Kennan, 
Diverting Traffic on the Web, 579 PLI/Pat 84, 94 (1999).  It is only illegal when 
the placing of information in the meta-tags or the banner ads causes confusion 
as to the source or content of the web site or banner ad, which generally occurs 
when a competitor’s trademark is used in the meta-tag or banner ad.  See 
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Asiafocus, 1998 WL 724000, at *6 (E.D. Va. April 10, 
1998) (citing 15 U.S.C. §1125 (a)(1)(A), (B)). 
 202. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 1998 WL 724000, at *2. 
 203. See id. at *3. 
 204. Kennan, supra note 195, at 85-86 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc., 1998 
WL 72400, at * 3). 
 205. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 55 F. 
Supp.2d 1070, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 206. See id. 
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would in a meta-tag scenario, the search engine would only 
search its index of banner ads.207  Moreover, rather than placing 
a web site address of an adult entertainment purveyor next to 
PEI’s web site address on the search results page, the search 
engine would instead place a banner ad on such page.208  Thus, 
both banner ads and meta-tags operate in a similar manner to 
accomplish the goal of directing traffic to the defendants’ web 
sites. 
Generally, the use of another’s trademark in one’s meta-
tag does not comport with the Fair Use Doctrine under the 
Lanham Act.209  The only situations in which such use of 
another’s trademark is legal is (1) when it is the truthful use of 
the trademark, for example, to identify one’s products or 
services, and (2) when it is used in comparative 
advertisements.210  Given that banner ads and meta-tags are 
functional equivalents, logically banner ads should be subject to 
the same sort of restrictions that meta-tags are subject to.  
Thus, when banner ads use trademarks, as the defendants did, 
they should be limited to identifying one’s products or 
comparative advertisements. 
 
2. Economic Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner 
 Ad Keying 
 
The problem with meta-tags is that they permit the 
misappropriation of the trademark holder’s goodwill.  An 
example would be a situation in which a user searches for 
company X’s electronic equipment; company Y, a competitor, 
includes company X’s name in its meta-tag such that when the 
search results page is displayed, the user will see Y’s web site 
address in front of or next to X’s web site address.  If the user 
selects Y’s site, believing it to be X’s site, Y has 
misappropriated X’s goodwill.  As noted in Section III(C)(1), 
banner ads work in a similar manner, except that instead of 
comparing the web sites of X and Y, it compares X’s web site to 
 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1036. 
 210. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.  An example of a 
truthful use is Ms. Welles’ use of the trademarks Playboy and Playmate to 
describe herself.  See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1105 
(S.D. Cal. 1998).  An example of a comparative advertisement would be a Visa 
commercial, explaining that a certain company will not take American 
Express cards. 
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Y’s banner ad.  If a user goes to the banner ad, believing that it 
is associated with X, Y has misappropriated X’s goodwill.  The 
misappropriation of another’s goodwill is known as free 
riding.211  Trademark law seeks to prevent free riding, and 
trademark holders have the right to enjoin others from 
committing such misrepresentations.212 
If the District Court’s ruling in the instant case were 
allowed to stand, consider the impact it would have on 
trademark holders and would-be trademark infringers.  
Trademark holders would be hesitant to participate in, or fully 
utilize e-commerce, and if they did, they would have a lot less 
incentive to develop new products or increase the value of their 
goodwill knowing that competitors can capitalize on their 
research and development efforts.213  Would-be infringers would 
also have less incentive to develop products, because it is more 
cost efficient to appropriate the goodwill and reputation of their 
competitors.214  As a result, the growth of the digital economy 
would suffer and the purpose of intellectual property law will 
have been severely undermined.215 
 
3. Policy Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner Ad 
Keying 
 
In the long run, the court’s ruling could have a devastating 
impact on trademark holders by decreasing the strength of 
their trademarks.216  If competitors are allowed to use a holder’s 
trademark, over time the trademark will lose its distinctiveness 
and become diluted, and thus subject to abandonment or the 
defense of laches.217  It is very important for trademark holders 
to be vigilant;218 however, holdings such as the one rendered in 
this court effectively prevent trademark holders from doing so.  
If searches are not considered searches for trademarks, but for 
generic, English words, trademark holders will not be able to 
 
 211. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305; Weight Watchers Int’l, 
Inc., 744 F. Supp. at 1269. 
 212. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305; Weight Watchers Int’l, 
Inc., 744 F. Supp. at 1269; TMT North America, Inc., 124 F.3d at 881. 
 213. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 25. 
 216. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 837-38. 
 217. See Sloane, supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 839. 
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protect their trademarks in the Internet environment.  Also, if 
sometime in the future, trademark holders do show trademark 
infringement, they still may be denied a preliminary injunction 
because it is difficult to show irreparable harm when there is 
delay.219 
Trademark holders, in PEI’s situation, must also be wary 
of their trademarks becoming generic.220  In the long run, the 
holding in this case would easily lead to the public 
understanding PEI’s trademarks “playboy” or “playmate” to 
refer to adult entertainment.  In fact, the court accelerates this 
process by implying that the generic meaning of these words is 
already associated with adult entertainment.  If Internet users 
key-in the words “playboy” or “playmate” and the search results 
page displays a banner ad for adult entertainment, they will 
eventually begin to associate the two together.  This process is 
compounded because of the number of purveyors of adult 
entertainment subscribing to defendants’ services221 
(presumably each time a user would type in “playboy” or 
“playmate” using defendants’ search engine an ad for a 
different adult entertainment web-site would appear). 
Providing an atmosphere where e-commerce can grow and 
flourish is perhaps the most important reason for restricting 
the use of banner ad keying.  E-commerce will play a major role 
in the future of our economy and the law should provide, to the 
extent possible, consistency and fair regulation.  Courts should 
apply established legal doctrine to the regulation of e-
commerce, but it should be flexible and the underlying 
economic reality should be considered. 222 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The District Court erred by concluding that the words 
“playboy” and “playmate” were used in their generic, English 
sense.  The court’s interpretation of these words is inconsistent 
with the interpretations in other cases and was likely due to 
the court’s unusually rigid application of traditional trademark 
law in the Internet context.  As a result, the remainder of the 
court’s analysis with respect to both the trademark 
 
 219. See id. 
 220. See King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 579. 
 221. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 55 F. 
Supp.2d 1070, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 222. See id. at 1073; Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054. 
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infringement and dilution issues was also erroneous.  The 
court’s decision could significantly slow the growth of e-
commerce both by deterring business participation in the 
digital economy and by encouraging free riding.  Laws and 
policies governing e-commerce must be catered toward 
businesses because, as noted before, e-commerce will be led by 
business, while the government plays only a minor role in its 
development.  What does this all mean?  It means that e-
commerce must be allowed to develop in a market-driven 
environment, unhampered by intrusive regulation and 
stringently — as well as inconsistently — applied law.  Because 
of the court’s flawed analysis and the consequent negative 
impact on the development of e-commerce, the holding in this 
case should be overruled.  Accordingly, based on the analysis 
presented above, a preliminary injunction should be granted to 
PEI. 
In addition, consistent with the rationale behind the 
general presumption of illegality of meta-tags, the purpose of 
the Lanham Act and trademark law generally, and the policy 
reasons put forth above, banner ad keying, like meta-tags, 
should be subject to the fair use doctrine. 
 
